Brexit on the island of Ireland: beyond unique circumstances by Schiek, Dagmar
Brexit on the island of Ireland: beyond unique circumstances
Schiek, D. (2018). Brexit on the island of Ireland: beyond unique circumstances. Northern Ireland Legal
Quarterly, 69(3), 367-395.
Published in:
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2018 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly.
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:20. Sep. 2018
Brexit on the island of Ireland: 
beyond unique circumstances
DAGMAR SCHIEK*
Queen’s University Belfast
NILQ 69(3): 367–95
Abstract
This article offers an original analysis of  Ireland’s and the UK’s common EU membership in the light of
Brexit, identifies socio-economic decline and threats to the functionality of  the Good Friday Agreement as
decisive threats emanating from Brexit, and suggests that these can be counteracted by providing a
sustainable legal framework for hybridity of  Northern Ireland in the categories of  citizenship and territory,
as well as for deepening socio-economic and civic integration on the island of  Ireland, alongside securing
antidiscrimination law in Northern Ireland. Instead of  protecting these elements, the Draft Protocol on
Ireland/Northern Ireland to the EU–UK Draft Withdrawal Agreement sacrifices the indivisibility of  the
Internal Market by limiting Northern Ireland’s access to markets in goods. Concise changes to the draft are
proposed to address these shortcomings and to secure participation of  Northern Ireland’s representatives in
its implementation.
Keywords: Ireland/Northern Ireland; Brexit; European Union law; Draft 
Protocol Ireland/Northern Ireland Withdrawal Agreement; hybrid citizenship;
antidiscrimination law
1 Introduction
The position of  the island of  Ireland – comprising Ireland and Northern Ireland – hasgained prominent recognition in negotiating the first ever departure of  a Member State
from the European Union (EU). A special task force of  the EU Commission and the UK
negotiating teams on the withdrawal process addressed the ‘unique circumstances on the
island of  Ireland’,1 and a special chapter in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement is dedicated to
them. Initially, the Commission had even pledged not to negotiate as much as the outline
of  the EU–UK future relationship before these unique circumstances were addressed.
However, the ‘Irish question’ has since escaped any agreed solution, although the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement has reduced it to the aim of  avoiding two ills: a hard border between
NILQ autumn 2018
*     Thanks go to feedback by the anonymous referees and discussants of  these thoughts at the conference from
which this work originates, as well as in the context of  the TREUP project (see also introduction to this issue).
All internet sources were last accessed on 28 August.
1     This term was included in the European Council’s (Article 50 TEU) negotiation mandate for the EU
Commission of  22 May 2017 (Council of  the European Union, XT 21016/17
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21766/directives-for-the-negotiation-xt21016-ad01re02en17.pdf>. 
Ireland and Northern Ireland and the diminution of  rights in the context of  the Good
Friday Agreement.
This article argues that the unique circumstances on the island of  Ireland are of
pivotal relevance to the EU as a whole. Since the UK and Ireland acceded to the
European Economic Community (EEC) without being required to address human rights
violations or territorial conflicts first, their EU membership has been based on the
assumption that such problems would be solved by membership itself. The ‘Irish
question’ thus highlights the potency of  the EU’s socio-economic integration project for
enabling sustainably peaceful relations between the peoples of  Europe. It is thus
imperative for the EU to solve the ‘Irish question’. Accordingly, the temptation may
become compelling to redefine it narrowly and/or to agree to a feigned solution. Both
strategies not only fail to solve the ‘Irish question’, but also have the potential to
undermine the EU integration project as a whole.
In order to develop this argument, the article proceeds as follows: section two recalls
the state of  affairs on the island of  Ireland at the time of  UK and Irish accession to the
EEC, identifying the unresolved status of  Northern Ireland as the core problem. Next, it
considers the relevance of  common EU membership for the Good Friday Agreement,
which after all is viewed as having resolved that problem. This part concludes that EU law
is indispensable for the realisation of  two central ambitions of  the Agreement, namely a
hybrid position of  Northern Ireland in terms of  territory and citizenship and the
improvement of  the socio-economic position in Northern Ireland. Section three
summarises how the ‘Irish question’ has been reflected upon academically and politically
in relation to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. This part concludes with an analysis of
the relevant parts of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement in relation to the two central areas
where EU membership remains a pivotal precondition for the Good Friday Agreement.
The fourth part discusses how far the Draft Withdrawal Agreement must be considered
as betraying the indivisibility of  the Internal Market as a central EU value, and how this
is likely to impact on the conclusion of  the withdrawal process. In conclusion, tentative
perspectives to overcome its shortcomings will be offered.
2 The UK and Ireland in the EEC, EC and EU
It is worthwhile to recall the concurrent accession of  Ireland and the UK to the EEC in
order to identify the specific problems caused for the island of  Ireland by the UK’s
unilateral withdrawal from today’s EU.2
2.1 JOINING THE EEC: NORTHERN IRELAND AS A CORE ISSUE
While both states joined at the same time, their motives could not have been more
different.3 For Ireland, EEC membership constituted a further step towards full
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2     Today’s EU started out as European Economic Community in 1957, which was its name when the UK and
Ireland acceded. The Maastricht Treaty (1993), in force when the Good Friday Agreement was negotiated,
renamed the EEC to EC, while also creating the EU as a roof  over three pillars, the EC (to which the EEC
was re-baptised), the Common Security and Justice Policy, and its three-pillar structure triggered a long-lasting
academic discussion on whether the EU was an independent entity and the overarching identity of  the EC
and the EU or whether the EC was the only relevant category. This debate is now superfluous, as the Treaty
of  Lisbon has merged the EC and EU into the EU.
3     Anthony M Collins, ‘EU Law in Ireland Post-Brexit’(2018) 21 Trinity College Law Review 9–30, 8.
international recognition of  the young state,4 as well as the opportunity to overcome the
structural disadvantages of  a small state through pooling of  sovereignty.5 Joining the
EEC underlined its aspiration to open up the country to international trade, and offered
the opportunity to lessen the pressure of  external competition as a lever to
modernisation, an aim that would also be eased by access to EEC structural funds and
agricultural subsidies. The concern of  losing access to the UK market competed with the
aim of  overcoming an ‘unbalanced economic relationship with Britain’,6 while the option
to soften the division of  the island of  Ireland constituted an added advantage.7 The
accession process was accompanied by a public debate, stressing the progressive nature
of  European integration, and completed by a referendum, just as any future Treaty
change,8 resulting in a relatively high level of  public awareness of  the EEC, EC and EU.
By contrast, the UK is viewed as a reluctant applicant.9 It rejected the offer to
participate in the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the EEC (1957) on the
grounds that it wished to retain preferential trade relations with the Commonwealth
countries and could not succumb to free movement of  workers. It aspired to a free trade
association of  the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation states with the
new EEC, which would allow it to access the Common Market without such obligations.
When the EEC states refused such an arrangement, the UK supported the Norwegian
initiative to form a European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which did not cover factor
mobility and had no judicial authority. The ink under the 1960 EFTA agreement had
barely dried when the UK applied for EEC membership in 1961: the access to the EEC
Common Market appeared more relevant due to its size. These economic motives to
accede to the EEC became more pressing with a weakening economy, forcing the UK to
apply for International Monetary Fund support in 1967, and inflating unemployment
figures at the turn of  the next decade.10 The accession was portrayed as merely related to
the Common Market. When acceptance by a referendum was sought in 1975, this was for
internal political reasons rather than as a constitutional requirement.
While joining the EEC, the UK and Ireland had an ongoing territorial disagreement:
The UK claimed Northern Ireland as part of  its territory, and also effectively governed
the province, while the Irish Constitution of  1937 stated in Article 2 that Ireland
encompassed all 32 counties on the island of  Ireland, though Article 3 conceded that
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4     Ireland had only became formally independent from the UK in 1922, i.e. 50 years before joining the EEC, at
the price of  giving up sovereignty over six of  its 32 counties. It fully surpassed its status as a UK dominion
and Member of  the British Commonwealth as late as 1949. Its membership application to the UN only
succeeded in 1955. See further Birgit Laffan and Jane O’Mahoney, Ireland and the European Union (Palgrave
Macmillan 2008) 12–17.
5     Laffan and O’Mahoney (ibid) refer to sharing (13) or pooling of  sovereignty (31), while Katy Hayward
wonders why Ireland would give up sovereignty to the EU: Katy Hayward, Irish Nationalism and European
Integration (Manchester University Press 2009) 11, 45.
6     Collins (n 3) 13.
7     This motive is stressed by Adrian Guelke, ‘Britain after Brexit: The Risk to Northern Ireland’ (2017) 28
Journal of  Democracy 42–52, 43; see also Hayward (n 5) who depicts the accession to the EU as (among
others) motivated by feeding a new narrative for Irish nationalism which would include the North. 
8     Gavin Barrett, Why Does Ireland Have All Those EU Referendums? (Institute for International and European
Affairs 2012). See, on the rejection of  the Treaty of  Lisbon, Anthony Arnull, ‘Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty:
All’s Well that Ends Well?’, in Anthony Arnull (ed), A Constitutional Order of  States? (Hart 2011) 77–91.
9     See for a summary with hindsight, Simon Bulmer and Lucia Quaglia, ‘The Politics and Economics of  Brexit’
(2018) 25 Journal of  European Public Policy 1089–98, 1090–2; from a contemporary perspective, see Lee
Burke, ‘Britain and the EEC’ (1967) 130 World Affairs 163–76.
10   Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of  the European Union (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 99–100,
with further references. 
Irish parliamentary legislation would not encompass Northern Ireland. In Northern
Ireland, the dispute was one of  the bases for a paramilitary conflict between two ethno-
political groups: the Unionists (often of  Protestant affiliation) supported the union
between Britain and Northern Ireland, while Nationalists (predominantly Catholic)
endeavoured a united Ireland.11 British rule in Northern Ireland was punctuated by state
activities provoking litigation under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), with the practice of  imprisoning persons without trial (‘internment’) as a
prominent example.12 There were also considerable socio-economic problems in
Northern Ireland, with poverty and destitution particularly pronounced among the
Catholic population.13
Today, a dubious human rights record would prevent any accession to the EU under
Articles 6, 48 and 49 of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU),14 and border disputes
presently halt accession of  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.15 However, in 1972, the EEC
was just developing human rights protection,16 and territorial disputes between applicant
countries were not discussed at all.
Since the EEC was, as the EU is today, a peace project based on the equality and
cooperation of  its Member States, the conflict had to be overcome, however. One can
only assume in hindsight that the optimism for the effectiveness of  the European
integration project outweighed any concern that the EEC had just acquired two
potentially warring Member States.
2.2. IMPACT OF EEC MEMBERSHIP IN IRELAND AND THE UK AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Common EEC membership benefitted both Ireland and the UK through offering a larger
market and triggering expansion and efficiency gains, while both countries became net
recipients through the EEC structural funds. Both countries profited from free
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11   Terminology is fraught with ideology here. The term conflict competes with the term ‘Troubles’ (with and
without capital ‘T’), while some classified the conflict as civil war, and claimed that any prisoners were
prisoners of  war under the UN’s Geneva Convention. See, for an extensive explication, Brice Dickson, The
European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford University Press 2010) 5–6). The
conflict is not fundamentally religious, and reference to Protestants and Catholics does not include adherents
of  those religions who came to Northern Ireland from countries other than the UK and Ireland. On the
erroneous classification of  the so-called sectarian conflict as neither ethnic nor racial, see Chris Gilligan,
Northern Ireland and the Crisis of  Anti-Racism (Manchester University Press 2017) in particular 23–44. Nowadays,
when Islamophobia becomes an accepted and EU-funded field of  study (see, for example, Ian Law, Amina
Easat-Daas and Salman Sayyid, Dominant Counter-narratives to Islamophobia: Comparative Report (CIK Working
Paper, University of  Leeds2018); there is a whole new dimension in which analysis of  Northern Ireland could
once again become leading in antidiscrimination law.
12   For a thorough discussion of  the only partially successful challenges under the ECHR, see Dickson (n 11);
Onder Bakircioglu and Brice Dickson, ‘The European Convention in Conflicted Societies: The Experience of
Northern Ireland and Turkey’ (2017) 66 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 263–94.
13   John Coakely, ‘The British–Irish Relationship in the Twenty-First Century’ (2018) 17 Ethnopolitics 306–24,
315.
14   See on the example of  Serbia Beata Huszka, ‘Human Rights on the Losing End of  EU Enlargement: The
Case of  Serbia’ (2018) 56 Journal of  Common Market Studies 352–67.
15   While the absence of  border conflicts is not formally an accession criterion, the recent dispute between
Croatia and Slovenia over their common border, a heritage of  the dissolution of  Yugoslavia, before the 
Court of  Justice (case number C-457/18) has motivated the EU Commission to insist on any other border
issues to be resolved before accession of  other former Yugoslavian sub-states (see answer of  Mr Hahn for
the Commission to a question in the European Parliament of  6 May 2018
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2018–001063&language=EN>.
16   On the relation of  the EU to human rights, see Marton Varju, European Union Human Rights Law: The Dynamics
of  Interpretation and Context (Edward Elgar 2014).
movement of  workers initially by being able to ‘export’ their work-force, often through
temporary works agencies. Irish workers moving between Ireland and the UK saw their
rights underpinned by EU law and its predecessors, which had enormous practical
consequences in particular for cross-border workers, a category most relevant on the
island of  Ireland. 
For Ireland, modernisation meant moving from a mainly agricultural country towards
an industrialised and high-tech one with a significant financial sector.17 Ireland managed
its industrial modernisation through a social partnership policy, among others, while also
introducing social benefits for the first time.18 It achieved a remarkable degree of  trade
diversification, reducing the UK-share of  its exports from over 55 per cent in 1973 to a
mere 18 per cent in 2004.19
In the case of  the UK, the access to the Common Market offset the decline of  its
industrial base. In most EU Member States, state social policy (in most cases underpinned
by rights) softened the negative impact of  the restructuring of  industries on citizens’
livelihoods, by instruments such as expensive redundancy plans by employers and
employment agencies, which increasingly also had retraining programmes. In the UK,
there was no such cushioning, and from 1979 the Conservative Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher ran roughshod over any remaining social consciousness with her explicit disdain
for society at large.20
Socio-economic developments on the island of  Ireland were contradictory, though.
While the Ireland of  the 26 countries transformed through modernisation beyond
industrialisation, the establishment of  an effective service and financial sector, and a
differentiation of  trade to reduce dependency from the UK, Northern Ireland suffered
from economic decline. The former industrial strength of  the six counties, depending on
shipyards and other heavy industry, became a victim of  the fundamental shifts in the
global economy. Further, the continuing conflict, with paramilitary violence and an
extensive presence of  British troops, caused widespread destruction and impacted on the
economy as a whole, while business retreated from the province and left behind mainly
the agricultural and the public sectors, the latter with a certain emphasis on security. Thus,
upon entering the EEC, the socio-economic discrepancy between Ireland and Northern
Ireland diminished, while at the same time economic exchange became formally easier. In
spite of  those frictions, overall concurrent Common Market access emerged as
instrumental to deepen the economic integration on the island of  Ireland.
At the same time, regular meetings of  Irish and UK government representatives in the
monthly meetings of  the Council of  Ministers offered ample opportunities for diplomatic
rapprochement, facilitating negotiations resulting in improving the governance of
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17   The 26 counties, prior to joining the EU, were even referred to as an ‘agricultural backwater’, while the six
counties were the most industrialised and advanced until the early 1960s, which came with a certain regional
price: Collins ( n 3) 14. 
18   Laffan and O’Mahoney (n 4). 
19   Central Statistical Office Ireland, Ireland and the EU 1973–2003 Economic and Social Change (2004), table 8.
20   The impact of  some of  the Conservative government’s social policy on the result of  the UK’s EU referendum
is debated in a special issue of  the Journal of  Social Security Law; see Charlotte O’Brien, ‘Brexit, Social
Security and EU Nationals in the UK: A Recent History of  Welfare Segregation, and an Administrative Storm
Brewing’ (2018) 25 Journal of  Social Security Law 1–3.
Northern Ireland.21 Incrementally, specific negotiations between the UK and Ireland
succeeded, for example, enabling common transport and energy sectors in the island of
Ireland. They relied on the legal framework provided by the EEC and later the EU.
2.3 RELEVANCE OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS SUPRANATIONAL QUALITY
The relevance or the specific character of  Community law is difficult to quantify, but it
certainly constituted a factor in the success of  all this. It rendered the EEC and renders
the EU much more than a negotiation space.
In 1972, the supranational character of  the then EEC was not just a slogan used in its
initial negotiation. Instead the Court of  Justice had developed the doctrine of  direct
effect and supremacy of  Community law, starting with the pivotal judgments in Van Gend
en Loes and Costa v ENEL.22 The effects of  EU law comprise direct effects – i.e. the ability
of  citizens to rely on the relevant provisions before national courts – and supremacy –
i.e. the capacity of  overruling national law. Direct effect, while only explicitly demanded
for regulations and decisions (Article 288 TFEU) also encompasses Treaty provisions and
Directives if  these are phrased in such a way as to be applicable by judges without
legislative implementation, though for Directives only in relations between citizens and
the state or its emanations. Supremacy comprises indirect and incident effects of  all EU
law, also such which has no direct effect through the principles of  interpretation of
national law in line with EU law and of  non-applicability of  provisions breaching EU law.
As a last resort, the citizen can also claim damages from the Member State which did not
implement an EU Directive or any other source of  EU law correctly. This is relevant,
because both states have a dualist disposition towards international law generally.
Nevertheless, Irish23 and UK24 courts generally accepted the EU law doctrine of
supranationality, and also engaged in extensive judicial dialogue with the Court of  Justice.
Without these supranational elements, the EEC Treaty would not have had the capacity
to become a legally binding and practically reliable basis for cross-border cooperation.
This legal regime had multiple effects on the relations between Ireland and the UK on
the island of  Ireland. One important example is the EEC’s programme to legislate in
order to obfuscate physical borders in the Community. While the Treaty created directly
effective and supreme provisions guaranteeing free movement of  goods, services, persons
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21   For an early example, see John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland (Blackwell 1996)
279–82, 302–6; see also Elizabeth Meehan, ‘“Britain’s Irish Question: Britain’s European Question?’ British–
Irish Relations in the Context of  European Union and the Belfast Agreement’ (2000) 26 Review of
International Studies 83–97.
22   ECJ 5 February 1963 Van Gend & Loes Case 26/62 ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; ECJ 15 June 1964 Costa v ENEL Case
6/64 ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; for standard textbook coverage on this see Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca,
European Union Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 185–315.
23   This even held for the disputed austerity measures, see Peter Charleton and Angelina Cox, ‘Accepting the
Judgements of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU as Authoritative: The Supreme Court of  Ireland, the European
Stability Mechanism and the Importance of  Legal Certainty’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of  Comparative and
European Law 204–15.
24   Paul Craig, ‘Britain in the European Union’ in by J Jowell, D Oliver and Colm O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing
Constitution (Oxford University Press 2015) ch 4; Anthony Arnull, ‘Keeping their Heads Above Water?
European Law in the House of  Lords’ in James Lee (ed), From House of  Lords to the Supreme Court (Oxford
University Press 2011) 129–48. The UK Supreme Court ruling in Miller (on which see below text to n 42),
though contestable in relation to the Good Friday Agreement, is a model case demonstrating how the
Supreme Court follows the doctrine of  supremacy and direct effect of  EU law. 
and capital by the end of  the transitional period in 1965,25 the existence of  different
national systems for VAT and the absence of  a uniform pre-declaration of  customs
consignments meant that border controls remained necessary in the Community, and also
on the island of  Ireland. The first ever Treaty Reform, the Single European Act of  1987,
facilitated adoption of  legislation realising Commission President Jacques Delors’
ambitious Internal Market programme, which contained the Community Customs Code,
adopted in 1992.26 It was this code that eliminated the necessity for controlling goods
crossing the borders within the Internal Market, since all levies as well as VAT could be
administered after the border crossing. Together with the Schengen Agreement on free
movement of  persons without passport controls, this code removed the necessity of
border posts in the EU. While the UK rejected the relaxation of  person borders through
the Schengen agreement, and Ireland followed this policy, the Common Travel Area
(CTA) in practice replaced this instrument – with the related weaknesses resulting from
its informality and complete lack of  legal enforceability.27 Taken together, the Customs
Code and CTA, which was expressly acknowledged as compatible with Community law
in a Treaty Protocol, made border controls superfluous. Any further checks on the Irish
border were purely motivated by security concerns.28
2.4 EU MEMBERSHIP AND THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
These decisive contributions of  EEC membership for normalisation of  the situation on the
island of  Ireland are not usually considered.29 Instead, the Good Friday Agreement30 is
often viewed as the high point and provisional culmination of  a ‘peace process’, in which
the contribution of  the EU is recognised, though not viewed as decisive.31 Accordingly,
when the EU Commission’s negotiation mandate on ‘Brexit’ as issued by the European
Council (Article 50 TEU) included a commitment to upholding the Good Friday
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25   Dating the Internal Market’s substantive creation to 1993 (e.g. C McCall, ‘Brexit, Bordering and Bodies on the
Island of  Ireland’ (2018) Ethnopolitics 17(3), 292–305) is factually wrong. 
26   Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of  12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, OJ
L 302/1–50 of  19 October 1992, and Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of  2 July 1993 laying down
provisions for the implementation of  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community
Customs Code, OJ L 253/1 of  11 October 1993, 1. This framework has now been replaced by the Union
Customs Code (Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  9 October
2013 laying down the Union Customs Code, 2013), which entered into force in two stages in 2013 (to enable
daughter regulations) and in 2016 (for application at national levels). The new code aims at completely
modernising customs procedures for importing into and exporting from the EU, and is still progressively
implemented (see for an official explainer <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/807e82ea-52ab-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search>. 
27   See also John Doyle and Eileen Connoly, ‘Brexit and the Northern Ireland Question’ in Federico Fabbrini (ed),
The Law and Politics of  Brexit Oxford University Press 2017) 145–7; on the CTA’s insufficiency as legal frame,
see Bernhard Ryan, The Implications of  UK Withdrawal for Immigration Policy and Nationality Law: Irish Aspects
(Immigration Law Practitioners Association 2016).
28   See on these and the symbolic relevance of  the border, Mary Daly, Brexit and the Irish Border: Historical Context
(Royal Irish Academy and British Academy 2017); on internal constitutional determinants, see Gordon
Anthony, Brexit and the Irish Border: Legal and Political Questions (Royal Irish Academy 2017).
29   For exceptions, see Meehan (n 21); Mary Murphy, Northern Ireland and the European Union (Manchester
University Press 2014), though from a political science and not from a socio-legal perspective.
30   Terminology around this Agreement is ideologically loaded. While those in Northern Ireland referred to as
Nationalists or Catholics usually use Good Friday Agreement, those referred to as Unionists or Protestant
often prefer ‘Belfast Agreement’: Guelke (n 7) . The EU Commission has opted for ‘1998 Agreement’, while
the European Council, in its negotiation mandate for this same Commission (below n 41), uses Good Friday
Agreement. This notion shall be used in the remainder of  the article. 
31   Guelke (n 7) 46; Katy Hayward and Mary Murphy, ‘The EU’s Influence on the Peace Process and Agreement
in Northern Ireland in the Light of  Brexit’ (2018) 17 Ethnopolitics 276–92, 278.
Agreement,32 some noted their surprise on this development.33 However, common EEC
membership had been stressed by the UK government as a reason to ensure new
arrangements for Northern Ireland consensually with Ireland as early as 1972, and the first
framework document for negotiating the Good Friday Agreement of  1994 again stressed
that EU-related matters should be discussed in the North–South bodies. Subsequently,
because of  opposition of  the Unionist parties to a strong role of  common bodies of
Ireland and the UK in governing Northern Ireland, the EU aspect was given less
prominence.34 In order to gauge how the EU should react to the Northern Ireland conflict
and its remainder in dealing with the UK’s withdrawal, it is vital to recognise how EU
membership underpins the Good Friday Agreement at every corner.
2.4.1 Short overview of the Good Friday Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement35 mainly establishes an institutional framework to manage
the fallout from the contestation of  Northern Ireland as a territory within its society,
attempting to induce peace through governance. The Agreement provides three levels of
institutions for governing Northern Ireland: the Northern Irish level (consisting of
Legislative Assembly and Executive – Strand One), the North–South level (consisting of
the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) – Strand Two) and the East–West dimension
(consisting of  the British Irish Council (BIC) and the British Irish Intergovernmental
Conference (BIIC)36 – Strand Three).37 Strand One is characterised by the requirement to
share power between Unionists and Nationalists, referring to the two communities at
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32   Para 11 of  the negotiation guidelines of  April 2017, which remain unchanged: EUCO XT 20004/17
<www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21763/29-euco-art50-guidelinesen.pdf>. See also n 94 below.
33   Colin Harvey, ‘Brexit, Human Rights and the Constitutional Future on These Islands’ (2018) European
Human Rights Law Review 10–12, 10.
34   Guelke (n 7).
35   For introductory coverage with further references, there are ample recent publications by political 
scientists Guelke (n 7); Hayward and Murphy (n 31) 6; David Phinnemore and Katy Hayward, UK Withdrawal 
(‘Brexit’) and the Good Friday Agreement (European Parliament 2017); and some by legal experts as well, see 
Brice Dickson, Law in Northern Ireland (3rd edn, Hart 2018) 1.27–37; Richard Humphreys, Beyond the 
Border. The Good Friday Agreement and Irish Unity after Brexit (Merrion Press 2018). The Agreement text can 
be found on the web pages of  the Irish and UK governments
<www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-
agreement.pdf> and <www.gov.co.uk/governmentpublications/the-belfast-agreement> as well as on the UN
peacemaker webpage, where some editing has removed duplicate headings contained in the signed version
<https://peacemaker.un.org/uk-ireland-good-friday98>.
36   In contrast to the BIC (see n 41 below) the BIIC was established by a specific Treaty between Ireland and the
UK <www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/treatyseries/uploads/documents/treaties/docs/200027.pdf>.
This very short Treaty reaffirms the commitment of  both governments to the Multiparty Agreement (Good
Friday Agreement). When common EU membership of  Ireland and the UK ceases, the BIIC remains as the
only forum where ‘in recognition of  the Irish Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland and of  the
extent to which issues of  mutual concern arise in relation to Northern Ireland, there will be regular and
frequent meetings of  the Conference concerned with non-devolved Northern Ireland matters, on which the
Irish government may put forward views and proposals’ (BIIC, No 5).
37   The Three Strand Architecture and the power-sharing principles between the two communities and 
‘neutrals’ were not an entirely new invention: in 1973 the British government had introduced these 
same principles, and these were later confirmed in the Sunningdale Agreement based on cross-
community negotiations under participation of  the Irish and British governments. At the time, they were
opposed by Unionists, who called a general strike (which was enforced by paramilitaries) and intensified
paramilitary activity. See Gordon Gillespie, ‘Northern Ireland 1963–1998’
<www.qub.ac.uk/sites/irishhistorylive/IrishHistoryResources/Articlesandlecturesbyourteachingstaff/Northe
rnIreland1963–1998/#d.en.189201>; Paul Dixon, ‘Why the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland Is
not Consociational’ (2005) 76 The Political Quarterly 357–67; Siobhán Fenton, The Good Friday Agreement
(Biteback Publishing 2018) 500–52. 
several places in the Agreement. It also establishes the principle that some powers are
‘devolved’ to the Northern Irish institutions. These three strands are framed by a chapter
on Constitutional Questions (see below) and chapter 6 on ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality
of  Opportunity’ (also see below), as well as chapters 7 to 10 on decommissioning, security,
policing and justice, prisoners and validation implementation and review. The governance
arrangements are not discussed here, with the exception of  the principle to govern
Northern Ireland under the tenet of  cross-community consent; nor are chapters 7 to 10
considered. This reductionist view is justified by the focus on those provisions for which
common EU membership of  Ireland and the UK is formally relevant.
2.4.2 Explicit reference to common EU membership in the Good Friday Agreement
Despite some efforts to downplay its relevance in the negotiations, common EU
membership of  the UK and Ireland was prominently underlined in the Good Friday
Agreement, and even more so in the International Agreement between the governments
of  the UK and Ireland to which it is annexed. While the former agreement is frequently
characterised as merely political,38 the latter is an agreement under international law39 and
as such registered with the United Nations.40 It should thus be of  some significance that
the British and Irish governments concluded this agreement ‘wishing to develop still
further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between
their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union’. The Good
Friday Agreement itself  refers to the EU in the three strands dedicated to the institutions
governing Northern Ireland. For Strand One, which establishes the democratic
institutions in Northern Ireland, paragraph 31 demands that Assembly representatives
and the UK government will agree terms ensuring effective coordination and policy input
including on EU issues. The NSMC (to be established under Strand Two) shall ‘consider
the European Union dimension of  relevant matters’, while arrangements are made to
ensure that its views are represented at the relevant EU meetings (paragraph 17). An
annex to Strand Two identifies relevant EU programmes as one of  the areas covered by
the NSMC. The British Irish Council (BIC), to be established under a new British Irish
Agreement under Strand Three,41 should discuss ‘approaches to EU issues’ (paragraph 5).
2.4.3 Brexit and the Good Friday Agreement: the UK constitutional law perspective
Despite this prominence of  the EU in the International Agreement between the UK and
Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement itself, the UK Supreme Court in its Miller
judgement42 rejected the argument that the UK’s withdrawal of  Northern Ireland from
the EU constitutes a ‘change in the status of  Northern Ireland’. Such a change would
legally require the consent of  the majority of  the people of  Northern Ireland under
Article I(iii) of  the UK–Ireland International Agreement.43 The UK government has
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consistently stressed that in leaving the EU it would not respect the regional referendum
result in Northern Ireland, which returned a 55.5 per cent majority for remain. Instead,
the UK should leave the EU as one.44 This position would seem to be violating the
Agreement’s provision just cited. The Supreme Court ruling constitutes a contestable45
reflection of  the UK constitutional approach, which – as mentioned – includes a dualist
position to international agreements, rendering their legal effects within the UK wholly
dependent on the decision of  the UK institutions. This municipal legal perspective is
beyond the scope of  this article, except for illustrating the superiority of  common EU
membership or the endurance of  supranational law on another basis to any other
international agreement between the UK and Ireland.
2.4.4 EU membership and substantive aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
Beyond the explicit references to common EU membership of  the UK and Ireland, the
EU was and is decisive for the effectiveness of  two themes central to the Good Friday
Agreement: the hybrid status of  Northern Ireland and its citizens, and the Agreement’s
mission to promote socio-economic prosperity in Northern Ireland, as well as the role of
all-island socio-economic processes for achieving and underpinning both.
2.4.4.1 Hybridity of territories and citizenship
The endeavour to establish a hybrid identity for Northern Ireland is expressed in
chapter 2 of  the Good Friday Agreement. Article 2 of  the legally binding agreement
between the UK and Ireland confirms this by committing the ‘British and Irish
Governments’ to accepting as legitimate any choice by the majority of  the people of
Northern Ireland between supporting the Union with Great Britain and a sovereign
united Ireland. The fifth paragraph of  the chapter ensures that any sovereign government
with jurisdiction over Northern Ireland will govern with rigorous impartiality and respect
for equality of  civil, political, social and cultural rights, as well as freedom of
discrimination for all citizens. In addition, there is a specific obligation to govern with
parity of  esteem for identity, ethos and aspirations of  both communities, defined by their
wish to either retain the Union with Great Britain or aspire to a sovereign united Ireland.
This is followed by the commitment to recognise the birthright of  all the people of
Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as British or Irish or both, which
includes the right to either or dual citizenship, irrespective of  any future change of
Northern Ireland’s status. The Good Friday Agreement under the heading ‘Constitutional
Issues’ asserts that the participants of  the negotiations endorse the governments’
commitments and also pledge that they will recognise any free choice by the peoples of
Northern Ireland and Ireland as to whether Northern Ireland remains a part of  the UK
or joins Ireland, while also supporting the principle of  governing the province with
rigorous impartiality.
Strand Three of  the Good Friday Agreement further underlines this hybridity in
paragraph 5 under ‘British–Irish Intergovernmental Conference’ (BIIC), according to
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which the ‘Irish Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland’ is recognised and
regular and frequent meetings of  the BIIC are demanded on non-devolved Northern
Ireland matters, on which the Irish government may put forward views and proposals.
The BIIC may also ‘contribute as appropriate’ to ‘any review of  the overall political
agreement arising from the multi-party negotiations’, without any power to ‘override the
democratic arrangements set up by (it)’, namely the rules on Strand One. Since anything
coming close to joint government of  the UK and Ireland over Northern Ireland is
rejected by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the BIIC has not met since 2007, when
the Strand One institutions were restored after a 10-year lapse under the joint leadership
of  the DUP (Ian Paisley sr) and Sinn Fein (Martin McGuinness). It resumed its activities
in July 2018, following the relapse of  the Strand One institutions in early 2017, stressing
explicitly that the ‘bilateral co-operation’ enabled by the conference ‘needed to be
maintained and, where possible, strengthened following the departure of  the United
Kingdom from the European Union’.46
Though not explicitly referred to, common EU membership arguably constitutes a
precondition of  the hybrid status of  regions as well as of  persons. Hybridity of  regions
is facilitated by the possibility of  establishing common administrative units and processes
by the states for regions which, although formally divided by a state border, constitute a
natural and/or socio-economic unit. Such regions are officially referred to as ‘border
regions’, and subject to extensive EU research and funding.47 This funding is based on
the opportunities provided by common EU membership. These include the option of
pooling resources in order to establish transport systems, educational or health services
or upgrade the e-communication infrastructure for regions.
Hybridity of  people’s allegiances (to avoid the contested term identity) is at the core
of  the EU’s socio-economic project, which relies on cooperation of  people and
businesses even more than on state cooperation. The process of  European integration
was designed to stabilise transnational interaction between socio-economic actors in
order to engender solidarity between the peoples of  Europe and thus perpetuate peace
between their states.48 Early integration theory defined European integration as the
changing of  socio-economic and civic actors’ allegiances from merely resting with the
nation states to encompassing European-level activities,49 relying on the idea that
transactions between individuals would foster identification of  citizens with the wider
project.50 Today’s revival of  transactionalist approaches to European integration51 offers
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empirical evidence of  whether and in how far these assumptions can be confirmed. As
the EU is constituted as a Community of  Law, these aspirations are pursued by
guaranteeing judicially enforceable rights. Primary EU law, established by the Treaties,
provides rights of  economic actors related to free movement of  goods, services, persons
(as workers and entrepreneurs) and capital, alongside some rights conventionally classified
as social rights (free movement for EU citizens irrespective of  their economic status
under Article 21 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU),
employees’ rights to equal pay irrespective of  sex under Article 157 TFEU). Rights to free
movement of  natural persons (Articles 45 and 49 TFEU) also have a social dimension in
that they entail rights to equal treatment in the host country, which provides equal
employment rights and secures access to social institutions such as healthcare, education,
social services and social benefits. Secondary EU law creates the frameworks for utilising
these rights, including, but not limited to their social dimensions.
It is worth noting that in enabling hybrid citizenship, the rights to free movement of
persons as self-employed entrepreneurs, employees, service providers and recipients, and
in a civic capacity are possibly more relevant than the right to trade across borders. While
it is cross-border trade which triggers immediate control needs through border posts in
the absence of  the EU Customs Code, transnational identities are – if  at all – encouraged
by the option of  cross-border lives (i.e. the right to work, shop, convene and stroll across
borders). EU law underpins these activities by rights which are – by contrast to the Good
Friday Agreement – enforceable in UK and Irish courts, with the European Court of
Justice as an arbitrator. In a region where human rights abuses were a daily occurrence,
this is not negligible. Further, the regulatory service of  the EU, in areas such as social
security coordination, access to healthcare, education and social benefits for frontier
workers and EU citizens in general, is invaluable in a region with a largely dysfunctional
Parliament which is mostly served by orders, rather than dedicated legislation issued by
the central Parliament.
2.4.4.2 Socio-economic improvement in Northern Ireland
Chapter 6 of  the multiparty agreement contains a number of  substantive guarantees,
under two identical (repeated) headings ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of
Opportunity’.52 The first paragraphs are focused on governing Northern Ireland, and
demand that this government actively protects human rights, in particular: the right of
free political thought, freedom and expression of  religion; the right to pursue
democratically national and political aspirations; the right to seek constitutional change by
peaceful and legitimate means; the right to freely choose one’s place of  residence; the
right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of  class, creed,
disability, gender or ethnicity; the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and the
right of  women to full political participation.
The second section, with the subheading ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Issues’,
requires for the UK government to promote ‘sustained economic growth and stability’ in
Northern Ireland, as well as promoting social inclusion ‘including in particular community
development and the advancement of  women in public life’. This is underlined by specific
political commitments to devise a regional development strategy for Northern Ireland,
which addresses the ‘divided society’, alongside strengthening the physical infrastructure of
the region, an obligation to adopt measures guaranteeing employment equality, including
through antidiscrimination legislation, as well as measures to combat unemployment with
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specific attention to eliminating the difference in unemployment rates between ‘the two
communities’. The UK and Ireland are both required to support linguistic diversity,
consisting of  the Irish language, Ulster Scots and languages of  the various ethnic
communities, with an emphasis on promoting the Irish language and the signing of  the
Council of  Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Rights.
These guarantees are only partly paralleled by hard guarantees under EU law. These
parallels are strongest in relation to two complexes: first, the right to freely choose one’s
place of  residence is underpinned by EU Treaty rights – the four economic freedoms
proscribe any detriments deriving from working (as employee or self-employed) in
another EU Member States or across a formal state border in the EU; and EU citizenship
rights partly extend this to those who are still in education, retired or not working for
other reasons. Second, socio-economic equal opportunity regardless of  religion and
belief, disability, gender and ethnic or racial origin is the aim of  EU antidiscrimination law
and policy, based on today’s Articles 19 and 157(3) TFEU53 and incorporating Articles
21–26 of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union.
Beyond any explicit parallelism of  rights, there is also a more general common thread
running through the Good Friday Agreement and the EU Treaties. All aim to engender
integrated societies: the former across the ethno-political-cultural divide, as well as across
a border; the latter through making national borders permeable and superfluous, as well
as through creating European-level socio-economic institutions. The conviction that
social change can and must be driven through rights-based socio-economic integration
underpins both the EU and the Good Friday Agreement.54
Bradley55 recalls that, while the Good Friday Agreement was being negotiated, little
attention was dedicated to the socio-economic conditions of  ensuring prosperity and thus
securing peace in Northern Ireland, criticising in particular the limited scope of  the socio-
economic authority of  the Strand One institutions, as well as the ill thought-through list
of  matters to which the BIIC should direct its attention (transport, agriculture, education,
health, the environment and tourism). However, one could argue that the lack of  more
extensive deliberation on socio-economic policies during the negotiations was due to the
recognition that common EU membership would alleviate the problems related to the
necessity of  including Northern Ireland in an all-island economy: the Common Market
would support such an economy regardless of  the exact terms of  the Good Friday
Agreement.
2.4.5 Relevance of common EU membership for Ireland, the UK and 
Northern Ireland
Overall, common EU membership is not only explicitly specified as informing the
bilateral International Agreement to which the Good Friday Agreement is annexed, but
also referred to in each of  the three institutional strands of  the Good Friday Agreement
as such. The Good Friday Agreement’s substantive provisions presuppose common EU
membership in so far as the ‘Constitutional Issues’ establish Northern Ireland as a hybrid
territory and its citizens as hybrid citizens, and the section ‘Rights, Safeguards and
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Equality and Opportunity’ demands the improvement of  the socio-economic situation in
Northern Ireland, as well as creating conditions of  equal treatment irrespective of  race,
ethnicity and religion within society.
Rights and political processes established as legally binding concepts by the UK’s and
Ireland’s common EU membership enable the realisation of  socio-economic and civic
projects to be extended into the whole of  both regions though artificially separated by
state borders. Guaranteed rights of  free movement and equal treatment irrespective of
nationality presently bolster the socio-economic position of  Irish citizens in Northern
Ireland, as they would have bolstered the socio-economic position of  UK citizens after a
future choice of  Northern Ireland to become part of  Ireland had the UK not decided to
withdraw. The rights basis of  more diverse and modern societies, as epitomised by Ireland
perhaps more than by Northern Ireland, are also served by EU law, in particular in its
legislation requiring Member States to adopt antidiscrimination legislation in employment
and beyond.
Accordingly, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU fundamentally challenges the
functionality of  the Good Friday Agreement, amounting to a change of  the basis of
Northern Ireland as a socio-economic and political entity. The preamble of  the
International Agreement seems even to suggest that the UK should have consulted
Ireland before lodging its application for withdrawal from the EU. All this would lead us
to expect that the question of  how the functionality of  the Good Friday Agreement can
be maintained even though the UK plans to withdraw from the EU would be addressed
in the negotiations of  the withdrawal agreement. Moreover, because the EU’s
fundamental ethos is mirrored in the rights-based construction of  the Good Friday
Agreement, the centrality of  maintaining its functionality in the withdrawal negotiations
is not surprising at all. The next section analyses how far these expectations are met by
the debate about the withdrawal process and its implementation.
3 The challenge of Brexit for the island of Ireland
If  EU membership resulted in socio-economic improvement on the island of  Ireland,
providing the preconditions for the Good Friday Agreement and for socio-economic
integration across the island, as well as between Britain and Northern Ireland, how will
Brexit factually affect this?
3.1 IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGE: ACADEMIC WRITING AND THINK-TANKS
3.1.1 Socio-economic risks
From 2015, well before the referendum closed, there have been stark warnings on the
specific consequences for Ireland,56 which have been confirmed by studies in 2018.57
One cluster of  problems arises from the island’s geographic position on the Western
outskirts of  the Union: it will be cut off  from the rest of  the EU by the UK as a third
country. This poses logistical problems for the trade in goods with the rest of  the EU.
The EU’s initiatives aimed at alleviating this problem include providing funding for
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increased sea transport from Ireland directly to other EU countries58 and to agree to the
control-free transport of  sealed containers with goods.59
The economic consequences of  Brexit for the island also result from the pertaining
orientation of  trade to the UK (or Britain in the case of  Northern Ireland).60 While those
studies are sometimes quoted to support the argument that trade with Britain is more
important than trade across the inner-Irish border, such a conclusion disregards the
existence of  all-island supply chains, which would be interrupted by eliminating the legal
framework of  the Internal Market.61 Maintaining supply chains in the absence of  the
Internal Market requires additional bureaucracy and thus time-lags and costs impeding
competitiveness. These economic issues are amplified for Northern Ireland through the
economic detriment of  its small size, which renders a close relationship towards if  not
actual reunification with Ireland an economically valuable option.62
Even positive impacts of  Brexit, such as the enhanced traction of  Ireland as a base
for financial and legal service providers in the light of  so-called passporting rights into
the EU,63 entail economic risk due to an already stretched housing market64 and
challenges for recruiting qualified and low-skilled workers.65 For Northern Ireland, the
latter risk is particularly austere, since its economy may lose access to the EU labour
market.66 Accordingly, to enable socio-economic prosperity in the far-eastern corner of
Ireland, an integration with an all-island economy, as well as an outward-looking
orientation beyond the UK are all viewed as necessary,67 alongside overcoming persistent
infrastructure deficiencies and counteracting outward movement of  young and qualified
populations.68 An additional risk emerges from the fact that EU funding, relating to
agricultural policy and regional and social funds, has favoured Northern Ireland more
starkly than the other areas of  the UK, due to differing policy preferences of  the EU and
the UK respectively.
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While it is recognised that economic aspects are not the sole factor to be considered
here, these aspects alone support the argument for Northern Ireland to remain part of
the EU if  possible,69 or at least in the European Economic Area (EEA).70 They further
would justify enhanced state aid for the island of  Ireland, and possibly even a specific
status aligned to outermost territories, in order to perpetuate a specific state-aid regime.71
3.1.2 Mainly a border problem?
While these challenges are undisputable, current academic and think-tank reflection72
tends to focus on the ‘border issue’. This is related to the characterisation of  the Good
Friday Agreement’s main achievement as the resolution of  a border conflict,73 which
results in defining socio-economic measures, such as maintaining free movement of
goods and persons into Northern Ireland, as border issues only.74 Similarly, a
Europeanisation perspective on the inner-Irish border may identify the achievements of
the EU as a mere restructuring of  the border, culminating in the warning that free
movement of  workers contributes to the UK’s preoccupation with border security.75 Such
contributions provoke the legal critique that the Good Friday Agreement does not
formally require the elimination of  an inner-Irish border, while it establishes institutions
to manage cross-border cooperation.76 Such thinking can be complemented by elaborate
proposals for smart border technology to make border crossings run more smoothly.77
However, even high-tech border posts are expected to bring back traumatising memories
of  the past abuse of  the border for intimidating those crossing it,78 to re-enforce the
border in the mind,79 and potentially provoke a re-emergence of  tensions between
Unionists and Nationalists, which some believe have been overcome.80 Legal scholars81
may also differentiate the border into different subject areas, such as a goods border, a
person border and a non-physical border, emerging from withdrawing mutual residency
rights of  UK citizens in Ireland and vice versa post-Brexit.
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3.1.3 Human rights, equality and ‘rights’
The human rights dimension of  Brexit in a Northern Irish context is another focus of
literature, including studies by and for Irish and Northern Irish human rights
organisations. Gordon Anthony goes as far as arguing that the threat to withdraw from
the ECHR is more fatal for the Good Friday Agreement than Brexit;82 and Donoghue
and Warwick have discussed how the idea to withdraw from the ECHR as a complement
to EU withdrawal constitutes a violation of  international law in this very journal long
before the referendum.83 The focus on human rights and equality is not surprising, as the
related guarantees differentiate the Good Friday Agreement from power-sharing
arrangements in the 1970s. Convincingly, the authors referred to so far recognise that
human rights protection as required by the Good Friday Agreement is not necessarily
impacted upon negatively by Brexit. A number of  authors stress the fact that the motives
which resulted in the overall UK majority for withdrawing from the EU may well be
indicative of  a heightened need for protection of  human rights, in particular from ethnic
and racist discrimination and human rights violation in the context of  immigration policy.
In this regard, Harvey, and Smith, McWilliams and Yarnell agree that Brexit may have the
advantage of  rejuvenating discussions on a human rights Bill for Northern Ireland, which
had already been envisaged in the Good Friday Agreement. They admit that this is not
required by EU law, and thus not directly impacted upon by Brexit.84
As already mentioned, there is some overlap of  general human rights policies and
rights guaranteed under EU law, as well as some rights to which the parties underwriting
the Good Friday Agreement are committed. On this basis, the Joint Committee of  the
Irish Human Rights Commission and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
have raised far-reaching concerns on the potential ‘diminution of  rights’, encompassing
the scope of  antidiscrimination law, data protection rights, the emerging inequality of
those citizens of  Northern Ireland who, as Irish citizens, remain EU citizens and those
who do not wish to claim an Irish passport for that reason, as well as a range of  EU-
derived rights for cross-border workers. Based on an academic report,85 the Joint
Committee takes the view that citizens in practice rely on rights derived from multiple
sources to support and protect their lives on the island of  Ireland. They also define as
their remit the protection of  citizens, irrespective of  whether they are British, Irish, other
EU citizens or indeed non-EU citizens. Under this logic would fall EU Treaty rights and
secondary instruments, such as Directives underpinning the antidiscrimination acquis,
Treaty rights, regulations and Directives protecting frontier workers, as well as the EU
Services Directive, which can be used as a basis for parents living in Northern Ireland and
working in Ireland to use tax credits received in the UK for funding childcare in Ireland.
The Joint Committee thus raises the point that EU-guaranteed rights, even if  they are not
human rights strictu sensu, are useful to challenge administrative hurdles and even national
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legislation due to their supranational character.86 The EU economic freedoms and
citizenship rights, though not an element of  human rights, thus emerge as functionally
equivalent to constitutional rights in the UK without a formal constitution, while they
complement the Irish Constitution where it does not guarantee those rights. A similar
point is made by McCrudden87 and the Northern Irish Human Rights Consortium.88
3.2 IRELAND/NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS
3.2.1 August 2016: an early positioning of the Northern Ireland executive
While the institutional arrangements of  the Good Friday Agreement and its national
implementation have not been sufficient to establish a government in Northern Ireland
for a period of  more than a year now, it is worthwhile pointing out that the former First
Minister, Arlene Foster, and the late Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, did
communicate a common position to the UK Prime Minister by a letter of  10 August
2016.89 The letter opened with a demand that the border must not impede free movement
of  persons, goods and services, thus stressing its socio-economic relevance. Next, it
stated the necessity of  avoiding a situation in which the border could develop into a focal
point for criminal activity, or a complication in the lives of  citizens. The next paragraphs
address Northern Ireland’s economy: business in Northern Ireland (whether indigenous
or based on foreign direct investment) should not lose the ease of  trade with nor access
to labour from the EU, both skilled and unskilled, emphasising that the public sector too
is dependent on the ability to employ EU citizens and non-EU citizens on the terms
generated by EU law. The letter also highlighted that the common electricity sector and
the all-island agri-food industry required a reliable legal framework, and stressed the
relevance of  agricultural funds for Northern Ireland (10% of  the EU agricultural funds
for the UK being allocated to farmers in Northern Ireland), pointing out that agricultural
products are predominantly exported to the EU and non-EU countries, which meant that
partaking in inner EU trade as well as profiting from EU trade agreements with third
countries were of  utter relevance. Given the fact that policy-making in Northern Ireland
should be based on cross-community consent, there are very good reasons under the
Good Friday Agreement to take this positioning as a starting point for identifying the
position of  Northern Ireland towards the EU after the UK withdraws from the Union.
3.2.2 UK and Irish position
The UK government has focused on avoiding physical infrastructures at the border
between Ireland and Northern Ireland,90 the continuation of  the CTA as well as the
Common Electricity Market and payments of  ‘Peace Money’ (programmed to expire in
2020) to Northern Ireland. It has launched its position paper on Northern Ireland, later
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complemented by the White Paper on the Future Relationship to the European Union.91
The White Paper on the future relationship repeats the principles established around
February 2017: the UK will leave the EU Customs Union and its Internal Market
(referred to as the Single Market), and no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of  the
Court of  Justice. In particular, there will be no free movement of  persons into the UK,
and any EU citizens accepted will have no claim to equal treatment with UK citizens. This
position has been branded as making a hard border inevitable, at the very least for goods
crossing a border. As regards movement of  persons and services, it will require controls
within the UK (and Northern Ireland) which will disrupt economic and civic activity not
only if  and when borders are actually crossed, but in Northern Ireland generally.
The Irish government has undertaken intensive consultation within Ireland on the
position of  the island post-Brexit, and early on positioned itself  with the aim of
maintaining the option of  uniting Ireland without the need to undergo an accession
process for the whole or part of  the country, as well as to avoid a so-called hard border
on the island of  Ireland. In this context the current Taoiseach has promised that ‘no
government will ever again leave North behind’.92 It chimes with the adoption of  a cross-
party motion in the Dail calling on the government to pursue a special designated status
for Northern Ireland in the EU in February 2017, and the overarching focus on
addressing socio-economic risks emerging from Brexit by the government, as well as key
interest organisations in Ireland.93 Nevertheless, the Irish policy is not wholly focused on
Northern Ireland. The government also aims at avoiding any restrictions on trade
between Britain and Ireland. That position has more in common with the UK
government’s than one would think, as the rhetoric is focused on trade in goods and
services, but not on free movement of  workers without a border. The Irish government
is also seriously concerned that violence might resurge in Northern Ireland.
3.2.3 EU Council negotiation mandate
The EU perspective on the Irish problem was first evidenced by the European Council
(Article 50) statement to the minutes of  its meeting on 29 April 2017, relating to
Article I(i), (ii) and (iv) of  the UK–Ireland International Agreement, which taken together
confirm the option of  the people of  Northern Ireland to opt for a ‘sovereign united
Ireland’. The Council:
. . . acknowledges that the Good Friday Agreement expressly provides for an
agreed mechanism whereby a united Ireland may be brought about . . . and . . .
that, in accordance with international law, the entire territory of  such a united
Ireland would thus be part of  the European Union.93a
The prominence of  the ‘Irish question’ is further mirrored in the negotiation guidelines
for the EU Commission regarding the agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
In paragraph 11, it states:
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The Union has consistently supported the goal of  peace and reconciliation
enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement in all its parts, and continuing to
support and protect the achievements, benefits and commitments of  the Peace
Process will remain of  paramount importance. In view of  the unique
circumstances on the island of  Ireland, flexible and imaginative solutions will be
required, including with the aim of  avoiding a hard border, while respecting the
integrity of  the Union legal order. In this context, the Union should also
recognise existing bilateral agreements and arrangements between the United
Kingdom and Ireland which are compatible with EU law.94
The ‘Irish question’ was among those to be resolved in the agreement on the UK’s
withdrawal from the EU under Article 50 TFEU. The staged process proscribed by
Article 50 TFEU means that the future relationship between the EU and a former
Member State is not fully addressed in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement, though the
withdrawal agreement has to be negotiated in view of  the future relationship. Maintaining
this distinction is important from legal perspectives, inter alia because the withdrawal
agreement has the same quality as EU law, and arguably also falls under the jurisdiction
of  the Court of  Justice of  the EU.95
3.2.4 Joint declaration of negotiating parties of December 2017
On 15 December, the European Council, sitting without the UK in accordance with
Article 50 TEU, was satisfied that the negotiations between the EU Commission and the
UK96 had reached a stage where the negotiations could proceed to consider the outlines
of  the future relationship between the UK and the EU. In the preceding negotiations, the
EU Commission has stressed that the solution of  the Irish problem was a precondition
for that progress. However, now the Commission recognised the provisional character of
the 15 paragraphs addressing the unique circumstances of  the island of  Ireland,97
demanding continuation of  negotiations on the ‘Irish question’ in a specific strand of
discussions.
The ‘December compromise’ reconfirmed the EU and UK’s commitment to honour
the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement (‘1998 Agreement’, paras 42–44), defining the
‘hard border’ – which is to be avoided – as ‘including any physical infrastructure or related
checks and controls’ (para 43). Also, the right of  people of  Northern Ireland to identify
as British, Irish or both was mentioned, alongside the commitment to EU
antidiscrimination law, maintaining the CTA without affecting Ireland’s obligations under
EU law and free movement of  all EU citizens (para 52–54), and a promise to honour the
current PEACE and INTERREG programme, while any future funding beyond 2020 is
subject to negotiation (para 55). Both parties specifically committed to recognise the
constitutional status of  Northern Ireland and the principle of  consent (para 44). In
addition, the UK pledged to respect Ireland’s place within the EU’s Single Market while
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it leaves the EU. The UK also unilaterally committed to ‘preserving the integrity of  its
internal market and Northern Ireland’s place within it’ (para 45).
The agreement that safeguarding Ireland/Northern Ireland will not be contingent on
the EU–UK future relationship (para 46) was elaborated by paragraphs 49 and 50, whose
convoluted language bears witness to late-night negotiations. These offer the UK the
concession that a ‘hard border’ on the island of  Ireland may be avoided through its future
relationship to the EU. Failing that, there are three fall-back options: first, ‘specific
solutions to address the unique circumstances on the island of  Ireland’ to be proposed by
the UK; failing that, the UK committed unilaterally to maintain ‘full alignment’ with
aspects of  the Internal Market and the Customs Union supporting North–South
cooperation, an all-island economy and the Good Friday Agreement, while also ensuring
that ‘no new regulatory barriers’ between Northern Ireland and Ireland develop, unless
the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree such new barriers, respecting the
principle of  consensus. Irrespective of  such consensus, the UK ensured access for
Northern Ireland’s business to the UK internal market.
Finally, there was recognition that Ireland’s unique geographic situation requires more
than maintaining the Good Friday Agreement in relation to transit of  goods to and from
Ireland via the UK is concerned.
3.3 DRAFT PROTOCOL ON IRELAND/NORTHERN IRELAND (EU WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT)
While the debate continues, the Draft Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the Draft
Withdrawal Agreement’s version of  19 March 2018 constitutes the last specified point of
reference.98 Its analysis reveals that the focus on the border, which is shared by a large
portion of  the academic discussion and the UK government’s position, has acquired
exceptional prominence, while the demand to avoid diminution of  rights is also
addressed. Socio-economic concerns beyond avoiding hard border posts are delegated to
a subsection of  the Joint Committee to be established under the withdrawal agreement,
without any attention to representation of  Northern Ireland on this committee, nor
consideration of  the power-sharing principles.
3.3.1 Content summary
The Draft Protocol consists of  five chapters with varying scope. Chapter I, headed ‘rights
of  individuals’, commits the UK to ensuring that ‘rights, safeguards and equality of
opportunity as set out in that part of  the 1998 Agreement’ are not diminished as a result
of  its withdrawal from the EU. It also puts the UK under an obligation to facilitate the
work of  institutions and bodies set up under the Good Friday Agreement, including those
dedicated to the protection of  human rights and equality. Paragraph 1 either commits the
UK to something it cannot achieve, or is void of  legal content: the ambitions of  the
Good Friday Agreement’s two sections headed ‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of
Opportunity’ contain commitments to uphold rights that go beyond the realm of  the EU.
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Those rights that are within the EU’s ambit are partly of  such a nature that the UK is
unable to uphold them on its own. For example, the right to choose a place to live is partly
underpinned by the EU economic freedoms, as any national legislation placing an EU
citizen under a detriment on the basis of  his or her place of  residence while exercising
one of  those freedoms is in breach of  EU law.99 These rights are, however, are reciprocal.
Since the UK is unable to guarantee that EU Member States maintain rights to free
movement for EU citizens, this obligation is overbearing. The provision may still have
legal content in relation to EU antidiscrimination law, which is mainly secondary law. The
UK can commit to maintaining the implementing legislation.
Chapter II’s sole Article 2 states that the UK and Ireland may continue the CTA as
long as it respects citizens’ rights under EU law, and also obliges the UK to ensure that
the CTA and associated rights can continue to operate without compromising Ireland’s
obligations under EU law. This has been read to prevent the UK from requiring Ireland
to operate UK immigration control of  EU citizens at the Irish border.100 Again this
provision is hardly of  major importance.
Chapter III introduces a Common Regulatory Area, which has been interpreted in the
media as including Northern Ireland in the Internal Market.101 However, the Common
Regulatory Area only maintains free movement of  goods – including electricity and
agricultural products – for Northern Ireland, as well as extending the frontiers of  the EU
Customs Union to include Northern Ireland.102 This has been smugly identified as
contrasting with the indivisibility of  the Internal Market, which the EU insists on
upholding as a principle103 – but for Northern Ireland. In a rather illogical fashion, the
Protocol also proposes to subject the Northern Irish economy to the EU’s state-aid
regime, while not mentioning the other provisions of  the Treaty chapter on competition
law (Article 9). This is most probably triggered by the 2015 legislation on enabling the
Northern Irish institutions to reduce corporate tax, which is viewed as potentially
violating state-aid rules.104 However, as this inclusion would also apply to companies
providing services and thus remaining excluded from the EU Internal Market with all the
accompanying risks, this could be viewed as an unfair allocation of  burdens. Chapter III
Article 8 demands that the conditions for North–South cooperation in the areas specified
in the Good Friday Agreement105 must be maintained in the course of  implementing the
Protocol and empowers the Joint Committee with its specialised Committee on
Ireland/Northern Ireland (Article 157, 158 of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement’s main
body) to make appropriate recommendation to the EU and the UK in this respect. Those
areas include fields belonging to the service sector, such as healthcare,
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telecommunications and tourism, as well as areas where an all-island economy depends
on freedom of  establishment (justice, if  comprising the services of  solicitors). Further,
employers and trade unions in those very sectors have pointed out that they depend on
continuation of  free movement of  workers. Thus, one wonders whether, through
implementing the Protocol, the Joint Committee is empowered to extend the coverage of
Chapter III to encompass freedom to provide services and freedom of  establishment, as
well as free movement of  workers.106
Chapter IV provides two different routes to enforcing the Protocol: under Article 10,
the Specialised Committee for Ireland/Northern Ireland should cooperate with the
NSMC established under the Good Friday Agreement, but not with the Northern Ireland
institutions or the BIC. Article 11 ensures that the EU institutions execute their powers
in relation to Chapter III as under EU law, and that any acts adopted in this regard will
have the same effect in the UK as EU law. Thus, the part-inclusion of  Northern Ireland
in the Internal Market encompasses retaining a supranational legal order thus far.
Chapter V includes those provisions of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement’s main body
which relate to the role of  the Court of  Justice, though extending the authority of  the
Court of  Justice case law beyond the point in time when the UK leaves the EU (Article
12(2) and (3)). This allows for the ‘backstop’ to continue functioning until the future
relationship between the EU and the UK makes its continued existence superfluous.
Article 12 also enables representatives of  the UK to participate in the EU’s comitology
procedures if  necessary in relation to the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol (Article 12
(4)), and extends EU data protection law and the Treaty reservation in favour of  national
security (Article 346 and 347) to the UK in respect of  Northern Ireland. All this is
complemented by more traditional international law-type safeguards, allowing the UK to
take rebalancing measures.
3.3.2 Avoiding a hard border and ‘diminishing of rights’
While the draft explicitly focuses on the issues defined as material during the academic
and policy advice debate, it is actually doubtful whether it addresses the related problems
adequately.
The inclusion of  Northern Ireland in the EU Customs Union and the Internal Market
for goods, including agricultural goods and electricity, will go a long way to eliminate the
necessity to control movements of  goods across the island of  Ireland. Thus, for this
purpose border posts will not be needed. However, the movement of  persons is fully
entrusted to the CTA and its continued operation, which is totally reliant on national law
and not based on any formal agreement between Ireland and the UK. As a consequence,
even the immigration status of  Irish citizens in the UK is not addressed properly. Further,
the CTA only extends to UK and Irish citizens. In the era of  free movement of  persons,
and some openness of  the EU to immigration from beyond its borders, there is a
considerable proportion of  EU citizens from other Member States and of  non-EU citizens
on both parts of  the island. Certainly, these populations are also targeted as tourists and
business visitors post-Brexit. Thus, the question arises how free movement of  EU citizens
into Ireland will be secured after Brexit, without compromising the immigration targets of
the UK. Article 2 of  the Protocol lays the burden on the UK to achieve this: there can be
no requirement to limit movement into Ireland in order to assert UK immigration targets.
All these controls must be established by the UK, either at its own shores or in Northern
Ireland. There is no barrier in the Draft Withdrawal Agreement to this.
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In so far as ‘diminishing of  rights’ is addressed, the Protocol operates a high degree
of  trust towards the UK. Article 1 does not refer to concepts of  Union law, and thus is
not encompassed by the jurisdiction of  the European Court of  Justice  under Article
12(2). While the UK remains bound to maintain all EU law protections during the
transition phase, there is no protection for the time thereafter at all. In so far as the rights
addressed by the Good Friday Agreement go beyond the EU’s limited remit in the field
of  human rights, this limitation is justified. However, the extensive human rights
protection required by the 1998 Agreement continues to demand specific measures by the
UK and Irish governments irrespective of  EU law.107
However, antidiscrimination law constitutes a policy field in which the Good Friday
Agreement’s demands reflect EU legislation: in 1998, the Treaty of  Amsterdam had just
been adopted, and with it the explicit competence for the EU to legislate in the field of
antidiscrimination law (today Articles 19 and159(3) TFEU). The institutions were already
discussing drafts of  the relevant Directives protecting from discrimination other than sex
discrimination, building on their extensive experience in this field.108 Interestingly, the
UK insisted on inserting an exception for the discrimination on grounds of  religion for
Northern Ireland because, on a conservative reading of  the EU Directives, positive action
would constitute a violation. This exception would arguably not cover the most
widespread discrimination in Northern Ireland, which is based on ethno-political
allegiance rather than religion. However, UK legislation has implemented the principles
of  ‘Fair Employment’ into Northern Ireland with reference to religion and political
opinion independently from EU pressures. Both the Fair Employment legislation and the
antidiscrimination Directives were implemented in Northern Ireland by order, namely
without the consent of  the Northern Ireland Assembly. These pieces of  legislation are
retained by the EU Withdrawal Act for the time being, while not excluding future change.
Further, the authority of  the Court of  Justice on their interpretation ends, alongside the
option to make references to the Court for national courts. As the supranational character
of  EU law ends as well, there will be no remedy (such as interpretation in conformity,
limited horizontal effect or damage claims against state authorities) in case of  incomplete
implementation or inadequate interpretation of  implementing law. This constitutes a
diminishing of  rights in this area, which is so important for Northern Ireland and
correspondingly spelled out in the Good Friday Agreement. The Draft Withdrawal
Agreement would not require any change whatsoever. Such change could easily be
achieved by replacing the words ‘As regards Chapter III’ in Article 11 by ‘As regards
Chapters I, II and III’. As the draft stands, it does not meet the expectations raised in the
academic discourse on the protection of  rights so far.
3.3.3 Hybridity of Northern Ireland: territory and citizenship
There is considerable doubt whether the Draft Withdrawal Agreement and Protocol
sufficiently safeguard hybridity of  identities and territories underlying the Good Friday
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Agreement in the same way as EU law. While EU citizenship of  Irish citizens in Northern
Ireland is protected in principle, UK citizens will lose their EU citizenship. The fact that
those who fall into the category of  ‘citizen of  Northern Ireland’ are entitled to claim Irish
citizenship does not fully alleviate this concern: under the Good Friday Agreement there
should be no nudging into an identity not aspired to by the citizens of  Northern Ireland.
More importantly, the hybridity of  identities relies on the full ambit of  EU citizenship
rights, comprising economic citizenship and its civic aspects. Economic citizenship
comprises the right to move for work and consumption, as well as providing services
across borders. Presently, the draft agreements do not allow the continuation of  cross-
border services, or for service providers to maintain or create establishments in Ireland
and Northern Ireland. While the latter is encompassed by the CTA, the legal reliability of
this instrument is dubious. Civic citizenship encompasses the right to move to and stay in
other countries for purposes other than economic ones, for example, participating in
charitable activity, political association or for educational purposes. As far as the CTA
protects some of  the related rights for Irish and UK citizens, it lacks legal enforceability.
Further, those citizens who have moved to Northern Ireland and Ireland from elsewhere
would not have the legally protected right to engage in those activities, and thus civil
society would be thrown back on a narrow definition of  the citizenry, depending on
where a person was born (only those born in Northern Ireland are citizens of  Northern
Ireland)109 and the residence status of  their parents.
The Good Friday Agreement also safeguards hybridity of  identities and territories
through the principle of  consent, in particular between Unionists and Nationalists. This
is established through the requirement of  consensual government in Northern Ireland
and the role of  both Ireland and the UK in the NSMC and the British–Irish institutions.
The Draft Withdrawal Agreement creates new competences of  the UK in relation to
Northern Ireland without ensuring that the people of  Northern Ireland are represented
in accordance with these principles. Thus, there is no requirement on the UK to ensure
that the members of  the Northern Ireland/Ireland subcommittee of  the Joint Committee
are appointed in such ways that Northern Ireland is represented in accordance with the
two communities. Similarly, where the UK participates in EU comitology institutions for
Northern Ireland, there is no guarantee that this participation is actually by
representatives for Northern Ireland. The institutional elements of  the Good Friday
Agreement have only ever functioned for limited periods of  time, and are presently
dysfunctional. If  the Draft Protocol was factually committed to power-sharing, it should
have established its own modalities to ensure that Northern Ireland representation for the
purposes of  implementing the Protocol is not actually UK representation without
reflecting this principle.
3.3.4 Socio-economic improvement
The sectorial access of  Northern Ireland to the Internal Market (reduced to goods,
including agricultural goods, and electricity) is also problematic with regards to the
commitment to develop the Northern Irish economy to approximate a mature developed
economy. The all-island economy, mentioned in the joint negotiator report in December
2017, is actually characterised by significant divergence between the Irish and Northern
Irish economies.110 The Northern Irish economy has not yet compensated for the loss of
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traditional industrial sectors, such as shipbuilding and shirt-making, by developing a
service economy. Instead, replacement industrial sectors could be stimulated while the
agricultural and public sectors provide additional employment and growth. While in
recent years some progress in expanding the service economy has been made,111 being
excluded from the integrated EU market in services is likely to have an additional
stymying effect, not only on growth in this important sector, but also on the desired
rebalancing of  the Northern Ireland economy and the creation of  employment
opportunities in a more inclusive way than possible by growing public sector,
manufacturing and agricultural employment. Depriving Northern Ireland of  access to the
EU service sector (which also requires freedom of  establishment and free movement of
labour) will continue to limit its adequate economic development.
4 Betraying the EU’s mission?
The Draft Protocol constitutes an even more problematic inroad into the EU’s resolve to
safeguard the integrity of  its legal order, and in particular of  the Internal Market. This is
duly mirrored in the European Council’s (Article 50) negotiation mandate for the EU
Commission, which states:
Preserving the integrity of  the Single Market excludes participation based on a
sector-by-sector-approach. A non-member of  the Union, that does not live up to
the same obligations as a member, cannot have the same rights and enjoy the
same benefits as a member. In this context, the European Council welcomes the
recognition by the British Government that the four freedoms of  the Single
Market are indivisible and that there can be no ‘cherry picking’.112
The Draft Northern Ireland/Ireland Protocol betrays this particular commitment by
offering to Northern Ireland the approach which is chastised as cherry-picking if  applied
to the whole of  the UK.
The indivisibility of  the Internal Market is increasingly questioned by UK-based EU
lawyers. Remarkably, even those who have dedicated their academic lives so far to free
movement of  persons in the EU partly demand a diminution of  individual rights,
conjuring the spectre of  fair movement as superior to free movement.113 Catherine
Barnard, for example, carefully exposes how the first drafts for the EEC Treaty did not
fully realise free movement of  labour. Instead, the Spaak Report, of  21 April 1956,114 did
envisage an incremental increase in the number of  workers allowed into the Member
States, which indicated that labour markets were still perceived as being under state
control. Barnard’s question of  how the gap between this approach and the guarantee of
free movement of  workers under the condition of  equal treatment at their destination
was closed can be answered, though: the conference of  Messina was accompanied by
dialogue of  management and labour, at the location of  Val Duchesse.115 The recently
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documented openness of  post-war Western-European social democracy for international
trade116 did not go as far as supporting a common market for capitalists only, as a
contemporary caricature summarised it.117 This was the reason why the Common Market
already entailed factor mobility, notably committing the founding states to free movement
of  workers by the end of  the transition period (1965), while free movement of  capital was
conceptually postponed.
Barnard is correct in highlighting that each accession round saw the Member States
waver in their resolve to maintain the indivisibility of  the Internal Market: free movement
of  workers was curtailed by extensive transition periods in 1985/1987 (accession of
Greece, Portugal and Spain) and 2004, 2007 and 2013 (‘Eastern Enlargement’, lastly with
the accession of  Croatia). However, this should not be a reason to support the factually
incorrect media narrative that the UK has been subjected to higher rates of  mobility by
EU citizens than other Member States.118 A number of  Member States, including Ireland,
host a higher share of  EU citizens in relation to the size of  their populations.
The present Treaties uphold the principle of  economic free movement rights as
indivisible, while allocating slightly less generous rights to EU citizens moving for
purposes other than participating in the Internal Market.119 Nevertheless, this prominent
critique highlights the necessity to analyse the normative justification for the Internal
Market’s indivisibility. The creation of  the Common Market, and later the Internal
Market, constituted an alternative model to traditional liberal free-trade expansion:
instead of  only offering free trade to producers of  goods and services, those whose
labour is contracted in producing those goods were granted equal liberty, alongside
individual entrepreneurs who wished to move to other states. As evidenced by the amount
of  initial EU social legislation, this infused the Common Market with social policy
elements from the start. The principle of  equal treatment of  free movers (whether
employed or self-employed) in their country of  destination constitutes a measure to
protect those already labouring in that country of  destination from exposure to
exploitative competition and a downgrading of  their livelihoods. Demanding to give up
on equal treatment may be in line with the increasingly conservative, and even right-wing,
inclination of  the EU’s electorates. However, it is not appropriate to alleviate the
concerns of  those ‘feeling threatened’ by free movement at any substantive level.120
The EU Commission itself  has given up the indivisibility in its proposal for or against
Northern Ireland. One could conclude that an EU Commission and Irish government,
both dominated by conservative parties, pursue the same agenda as the Conservative
Party of  the UK: to truncate free movement of  workers, and eliminate equal treatment
rights of  those who seek better pastures.
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5 Conclusion: is there any way forward?
It is difficult to conclude in any constructive way on the eve of  yet another round of
negotiations, previous iterations of  which did not bring substantive progress. It seems
highly unlikely that the UK will be able to address the ‘Irish question’ with any ingenuity.
The present government’s dependence on a sectarian Unionist party from Northern
Ireland defies the imagination that a balanced proposal on this difficult project will be
received in time for any compromise before November 2018. Thus, any solution will have
to come from the EU. The EU will have to consider the specific positioning of  the UK
with regard to the support and supply agreement between the DUP and the Conservative
government. This very situation makes it advisable to not offer anything to Northern
Ireland which is not available for the ‘Union’ (between Britain and Northern Ireland) as
a whole. This strategic consideration alone should have deterred the Commission from
drafting a partial inclusion of  Northern Ireland within the Internal Market.
As has been argued above, limiting Northern Ireland’s Internal Market access to free
movement of  goods does not even satisfy the minimum necessary for its socio-economic
recovery. It arguably also falls short of  protecting those elements of  the Good Friday
Agreement which originally relied on and were underpinned by common EEC
membership of  the UK and Ireland. The EU Commission should thus revise the Draft
Protocol to include the full ambit of  the Internal Market, maintaining its commitment to
its indivisibility as required by the negotiation mandate. The UK could then still request
that its whole territory is encompassed by what is offered to Northern Ireland alone, and
the EU could accept this request. This would also have the advantage of  providing a
model of  maintaining UK Internal Market membership without distortion of  the EEA
by the inclusion of  a new member much larger than the current EFTA states. Even if  it
is unlikely that the present UK government would commit to this strategy, a change in
direction would inflict less harm on the EU’s Internal Market project in itself.
Thus, the Draft Withdrawal Agreement should add free movement of  persons,
services and capital to the common regulatory area (Article 3). This would require
inserting additional Articles into Chapter III, as well as the expansion of  the suggested
Annex by all the legislation in this area, in particular the legislation on mutual recognition
of  professional qualifications, on free movement of  workers including the coordination
of  social security and those partitions of  Directive 2004/48 relating to economically
active citizens, as well as the Services Directive and Directives in the area of  financial and
online services.
As mentioned above, the Good Friday Agreement’s functionality is further threatened
by eliminating the institution of  EU citizenship from Northern Ireland. Presently, Irish
citizens will remain protected if  they already use their free movement rights, but the
protection of  those who do not in their future lives in the UK (including Northern
Ireland) relies on a legally non-binding CTA. In order to address this, Chapter II of  the
Draft Protocol could be enhanced by establishing that the people of  Northern Ireland, as
well as EU citizens who wish to move to Northern Ireland, continue to enjoy EU
citizenship rights, in particular under Directive 2004/38, by an addition to Article 2. This
would relieve the UK from undergoing a commitment which is impossible to fulfil,
namely to magically ensure that no diminution of  rights results from withdrawing EU
citizenship rights from a part of  Northern Ireland’s population.
Further, as regards the first chapter, an additional sub-paragraph to Article 1 should
state that EU Treaty provisions and secondary law guaranteeing equal treatment on the
grounds of  sex, ethnic and racial origin, religion and belief, disability, sexual orientation
and age continues to apply in Northern Ireland.
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In order to ensure that the additional rights and protections partake in the specific
quality of  EU law, the jurisdiction of  the European Court of  Justice should be extended
to these chapters. This could be achieved by deleting the words ‘As regards Chapter III’
in Article 11, in addition to some editorial revisions in Article 2.
Finally, the lack of  representation of  the people of  Northern Ireland in the
administration and also adjudication of  the Protocol should be safeguarded. The Protocol
or the main text of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement should specify that UK members of
the subcommittee on Northern Ireland of  the Joint Committee must be recruited from
the institutions established by Strand One of  the Good Friday Agreement, and during
times of  their dysfunctionality by citizens of  Northern Ireland elected in accordance with
the principle of  community consent. Since the Court of  Justice of  the EU would acquire
a permanent role in Northern Ireland, measures to ensure a corresponding input should
be taken. For example, a permanent Advocate General from the island of  Ireland could
be installed, with the proviso that he or she always advises the Court in matters pertaining
to Northern Ireland. For the General Court, a similar provision could be made. All this
would require revising Articles 8 and 12 of  the Draft Protocol and Article 158 of  the
main part of  the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
All these issues would of  course only be a ‘back-stop’, as already specified in
Article 15 of  the Draft Protocol. However, that Article should specify that the safeguards
for the functioning of  the Good Friday Agreement and socio-economic prosperity in the
Draft Protocol must be in place before the Protocol becomes inapplicable.
The EU should also not forget the interests of  the larger part of  the island of  Ireland
in approaching Brexit. The commitment of  the Joint Declaration of  the negotiation
parties to alleviate the socio-economic threat of  Brexit for the island of  Ireland needs to
be addressed.
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